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As America becomes more intertwined with the world economy, our trade
laws have expanded dramatically, becoming more comprehensive and more com-
plex. At the same time, there are an increasing number of major areas of trade
policy that the law does not effectively reach, and that will require not more law
but more far-reaching economic diplomacy. This speech reviews where we have
been, and where we may be headed with regard to our country's legal framework
for trade.
I begin with several trends in American trade law: the extension of law from
tariffs and quotas to a wide range of other issues such as services, investment,
and regulatory issues; the growing congressional involvement in the making and
administering of trade law; the increasing importance and complexity of our
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes; the evolution of section 301; the
growth of free trade areas; the expansion of mechanisms to resolve international
disputes; the increasing importance of laws regarding intellectual property rights;
and the changing framework for export controls.
Next, I discuss several issues for the future, issues for which U.S. laws are
not completely effective, or are still evolving. These include dealing with the new
multilateralism embodied in the NAFTA and the new World Trade Organization;
addressing fundamental barriers to market opening in Japan, such as Japan's
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corporate industrial structure (Keiretsu); working with former communist coun-
tries attempting to enter the global trading system as full members; and dealing
with the links between trade and such issues as environmental protection, workers'
rights, and human rights.
I suggest that the heyday for the extension of American or Anglo-Saxon legal
principles and practices abroad is over, and that we will be dealing increasingly
with other systems, particularly in Asia, that will put pressure on us to find new
ways to bridge different systems. Many of these bridges will require a degree
of diplomacy that goes beyond the usual preoccupation with immediate negotiating
strategy, embodies ever-increasing political sophistication in our foreign eco-
nomic policy, and is designed to head off crises long before they reach the boiling
point.
I am not referring to some fuzzy internationalism. I am talking about hard-
headed international politics in the post-Cold War era where trade has become
a centerpiece of foreign and domestic policy. It is not a call to retreat from our
historical leadership role in developing the global framework for trade, but to
think hard about what really constitutes the best way to be effective in pursuing
our interests.
I. Evolution of Trade Law in the Post-War Era
From the end of World War II through 1992 trade grew well over sixfold in
constant dollars, while global GDP more than tripled. The nature of trade became
ever more complex, with more multinationalization of production, more trade
in intermediate products as opposed to finished goods, more trade in services
as opposed to merchandise, more countries participating in the trading system,
and more variations of government involvement in promoting trade or blocking
it.
At the same time, an increasing number of transborder commercial transactions
have become subject to legal regimes. For example, in the past five years the
United States has negotiated the establishment of two free trade areas-first with
Canada and then with Canada and Mexico-that now cover 30 percent of our
exports and 26 percent of our imports. We have also negotiated a free trade area
with Israel. Since 1989 we have concluded nine bilateral intellectual property
rights agreements and thirteen bilateral trade agreements that contain intellectual
property rights provisions. We have concluded thirty bilateral investment treaties
(sixteen now in force). We have just concluded a major GATT negotiation that
covers virtually all of our merchandise trade and much of our services sector-
such as banking and construction-as well.
To get a better idea of the current setting for trade law, let us look at the
evolution of the GATT, in particular, to see how it has evolved from a tariff-
reduction mechanism to what it is today: an organization on the threshold of
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becoming a true mechanism for establishing the disciplines of world trade and
overseeing the resolution of trade disputes.
A. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GATT
The history of the GATT is, in part, the story of how the focus of trade
negotiations has changed from an emphasis on tariffs to an effort to reduce and
harmonize a much broader set of nontariff barriers to trade. With this shift in
focus has come a variety of new legal codes and, among other things, a new
and more comprehensive means of settling disputes. With the Uruguay Round, we
have entered new terrain: services, investment, and more emphasis on intellectual
property rights. With the post-Round work statements, the GATT now promises
to look even further, toward environmental and other concerns.
1. Post-1948 Era
In 1947 tariffs were applied to virtually all of world trade. The initial rounds of
multilateral negotiations-through the Kennedy Round-were limited primarily to
reducing, if not eliminating, tariffs. The Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round
continued this process toward the inevitable diminishing point, so successfully
that tariffs now account for only a small percentage of the total value of global
trade in goods.
2. Expanded Focus; Nontariff Barriers
Of course, tariffs are only one way of limiting and distorting trade flows. And,
as tariff barriers have receded in terms of their economic significance, the GATT,
with the support and encouragement of the United States, has expanded its hori-
zons and has sought to address a variety of nontariff barriers that either distort
market-driven trade flows or block them entirely.
During the Tokyo Round, for example, we started to look more carefully at
other, nontariff, impediments to trade flows. We addressed such issues as the
need for improvement and harmonization of technical standards, customs valua-
tion, and dumping and subsidies.
3. Developing Country Issues
GATT members also began to pay much more attention to "north-south"
issues: the important relationships-and the important differences-between de-
veloped and developing nations.
Dissatisfaction among developing countries with the results of the Kennedy
Round had already led to pressure in the GATT for improved access to markets
of developed countries. In response, in 1971, GATT members had approved
a ten-year waiver from the provisions of article I (MFN treatment) to permit
preferential tariff treatment to products of developing countries; in 1979, such
preferences were extended for an indefinite period.
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The United States responded to these developments by establishing, in Title
V of the Trade Act of 1974, the General System of Preferences (GSP). The
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984 reauthorized and
amended the GSP. Under the program, the United States provides duty-free
treatment to eligible products imported from any country that has been designated
as a beneficiary developing country. Currently, the program provides duty-free
treatment to imports of over 4000 products from approximately 140 developing
countries.
4. Uruguay Round Goes Further
In the Uruguay Round further efforts were made to reduce nontariff barriers,
and new areas previously considered off limits were addressed, including ser-
vices, agriculture, investment issues, protection of intellectual property rights,
and textiles. For example, we now have new disciplines on the provision of
international financial services. The so-called GATS Agreement (General
Agreement on Trade in Services) contains legally enforceable provisions dealing
with both cross-border trade and investment in services, and sectoral annexes on
financial services, labor movements, telecommunications, and aviation services.
The entrenched global system of agricultural subsidies and quotas, while not
eliminated, has been trimmed back, and further advances are now possible.
The Multifiber Arrangement will be phased out over a ten-year period, bringing
textiles and apparel under the general rules of the new World Trade Organization.
In addition, the GATT Agreement significantly improves market access for U.S.
textiles and clothing by eliminating many tariff and nontariff barriers and requiring
countries to take further market opening measures.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the
TRIPS Agreement) establishes improved standards for protecting the full range of
intellectual property rights in many important areas. For example, the agreement
provides for protection of computer programs as literary works under copyright
laws, product and process patents for virtually all inventions (including pharma-
ceuticals), and enhanced protection for internationally well-known trademarks.
The TRIPS Agreement also includes strong enforcement provisions that are criti-
cal to obtaining effective enforcement of the agreed standards and is subject to
the improved dispute-settlement procedures of the World Trade Organization.
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization will facilitate the
implementation of trade agreements in the diverse areas of trade in goods, ser-
vices, and the protection of intellectual property rights by putting all the disciplines
on government practices affecting trade under one institutional umbrella. In the
past, many arrangements did not include the entire GATT membership. The
implication is that there will be more coherence to the global framework for
trade, more discipline, and more systematic evolution of the law.
If you doubt that the new GATT is comprehensive, or that it will provide work
for an increasing number of trade lawyers, consider the fact that the Uruguay
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Round legal texts, together with the revised tariff schedules that result, will run
over 20,000 pages and weigh over 350 pounds. If you add to this the new volumes
relating to NAFTA, it is clear that it will take years to digest the statutes that
have evolved in 1993 alone.
II. Increasing Scope and Complexity of U.S. Trade Law
America's is a highly legalistic society, and becoming more so. While it may
be true that the entire corpus of federal statutory law, as contained in the United
States Code, may still fit onto one large bookshelf, these volumes-as you are
all too aware-represent only the smallest fraction of U.S. law embodied in
millions of pages of federal and state regulations and rulings and in federal and
state court precedents and interpretations.
So it should not be surprising that U.S. trade law has followed the larger model.
We have increasing numbers of statutes that are, as the following discussion will
suggest, increasingly complex, not only in their wording but in their administra-
tion. Following are six more precise examples of these trends.
A. TREND No. 1: INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN TRADE POLICY
Foremost among these domestic trends is the increasing role in the formulation
of U.S. trade law and policy. Among the developed nations the United States
is unique in the fact that the legislature plays a major role in the development
and enunciation of international trade policy. Congress's increased involvement
is, at least in part, a function of increasingly energetic private-sector participation
in the trade legislative process, both within and outside the Advisory Committee
program.
Fundamentally, the congressional role is provided for in article I of the Constitu-
tion, which provides, in section 8, that the Congress shall: "lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises" (clause 1), and "regulate commerce with foreign
nations" (clause 3).
Within this constitutional framework, the congressional role has expanded
significantly in the post-War era. This development looms large on today's land-
scape as the Administration prepares to submit the GATT Round implementing
legislation to Congress.
1. History of Congressional Involvement
Beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress has
provided the President with authority to negotiate trade agreements on an ever-
larger universe of subjects. However, since the 1960s Congress has also provided
increasingly specific direction with respect to both the negotiating process and
the results expected. Successive delegations of negotiating authority have included
more and more detailed negotiating objectives, while asserting more and more
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forcefully Congress's right to be consulted before, during, and after the negotia-
tions.
2. Framework for Negotiations
Congressional guidance on the negotiating process began in earnest with a
limited delegation of tariff-negotiating authority for the Kennedy Round. It grew
into the development of significantly more detailed procedural and substantive
standards and negotiating objectives. Today it involves the determination of many
of our national policies relating to trade with foreign nations, as embodied in
section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and a variety of other trade or trade-related
statutes.
As an example of increased congressional participation in the trade policy
process, it is instructive to examine the negotiating objectives offered by Con-
gress, in anticipation of the Tokyo Round, in sections 103 and 104 of the 1974
Trade Act. The overall and sector-specific objectives consume just over one page
of the United States Code.
Compare these objectives with those Congress developed in connection with
the Uruguay Round. In 1988, only fourteen years after the beginning of the
Tokyo Round, the objectives consume almost five full pages of fine print.
3. Conduct of Negotiations
The enunciation of specific, detailed negotiating objectives in connection with
a multiyear, multilateral negotiation is only the beginning of Congress's involve-
ment in the process. Congress has also participated in the negotiations process,
through close consultations with the executive branch-before and during the
negotiations, and even after their conclusion.
For example, the President must provide ninety days' notice to the Congress of
his intention to enter into an agreement. The notice requirement serves Congress's
interests because it affords a substantial opportunity to study the terms of the
agreement and, where necessary, identify and consult on concerns that need to
be addressed.
4. Importance of "Fast Track"
These notice and consultation requirements are part of the larger fabric of the
fast-track process that Congress devised for the legislative approval of major
trade agreements. Developed for the Tokyo Round in 1974, fast track offers the
President the opportunity of an expedited "up-or-down" vote on the legislation
that would give effect to the deal he has struck, while preserving to the Congress
its article I prerogative to "regulate commerce with foreign nations" and to "lay
and collect . . . duties."
However, while Congress has in essence delegated these authorities to the
President, it tied a number of strings to the delegation. It made prior notice and
consultations a prerequisite for the granting of fast-track consideration of the
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implementing legislation. In addition, Congress indicated its desire to have an
affirmative role in the development of the legislation. This has resulted in the
development of a legislative process unique to the United States, through which
congressional committees participate in the drafting of the implementing legisla-
tion that the President will submit and that will be referred to them. These mock
"mark-ups" assure that the bill actually presented (which, under fast-track proce-
dures, is not subject to amendment) is one that the Congress is likely to pass.
Finally, Congress built in a sunset provision to the entire fast-track process.
After a short extension for the Uruguay Round, the sun finally set on fast-track
negotiating authority on April 15, 1994, when Ambassador Kantor signed the
Uruguay Round Agreements on behalf of the President. Renewal of fast-track
authority will thus be necessary before the President can enter into any new
negotiations.
B. TREND No. 2: INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS
Two decades ago, practitioners had available to them a wide array of trade
law remedies. For example, section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act (the "escape
clause") was originally expected to be a widely used remedy for injuries resulting
from increased imports of fairly traded goods. However, because of various legal
requirements and interpretations, as well as economic developments, the trend
in recent years has been to bring almost all trade remedy cases under the counter-
vailing duty or antidumping laws, and section 301.
Let us look at the countervailing duty and antidumping statutes. Originally,
countervailing duty cases focused primarily on government practices that could be
easily identified as subsidies (for example, export bounties), and an antidumping
investigation was intended to take place on the docks with the customs officer
making the determination and assessing the duty on the spot. Today, countervail-
ing or antidumping duty investigations can take up to a year to complete and can
be subject to appeals in the courts for a number of years. They require enormous
legal resources, as well as specialized knowledge of accounting, economics, and
the industry under review. This increased complexity is due to two main factors:
first, the procedural safeguards that have been added to enhance the openness
and transparency of the system and, second, substantive developments in the
laws.
Since the Trade Act of 1974, Congress has amended U.S. law several times
to provide a wide variety of procedural safeguards. These procedural safeguards
include, among many others, expanded judicial review, access to business propri-
etary data through administrative protective orders, and a sophisticated verifica-
tion process. While these procedural safeguards have increased the transparency
and discipline of the system, they have also increased the complexity of the cases.
In terms of substantive development, the antidumping law has become more
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complex as it has been expanded to address a greater variety of unfair practices.
One example is the anticircumvention provision. During the 1980s, industries
began to shift production and alter products in order to circumvent an antidumping
order. The anticircumvention provision was added to the statute to provide a
remedy to stop this evasion. This provision and other changes to the law were
made to ensure that the law continues to provide an effective remedy against
unfairly traded imports.
Finally, antidumping cases themselves are becoming more complex. As busi-
ness practices change, the Department of Commerce is called upon to make
complex decisions in order to make certain that the law is fairly administered.
For example, the foreign exporter may not produce the merchandise under investi-
gation, but instead may control production through a group of interrelated subcon-
tractors. In these circumstances, the issue of who is actually the producer of the
merchandise is often in question and can lead to difficult factual determinations.
Countervailing duty law has also become increasingly complicated. This com-
plexity reflects, in part, the changing nature of government involvement in the
marketplace, as well as a growing sophistication in the kind of analyses we employ
to identify and measure subsidies.
As tariffs have declined over the decades since World War II, subsidies have
necessarily assumed greater importance and attention-in terms of how govern-
ments may influence economic and commercial events in their own jurisdictions,
and how they can distort trade flows internationally. However, in the absence
of clear and enforceable international rules either to regulate the use of subsidies
or to address their distortive effects, the United States has had to forge its own
rationales and approaches to deal with this problem. Moreover, many of the
concepts and methodologies we have developed have been incorporated into the
Uruguay Round subsidies agreement.
At the same time, we are also witnessing an evolution of our own law and
practice to grapple with the changing landscape of government support and inter-
vention. The days of straightforward government grants and bounties are nearly
a relic of the past. Today, governments must take account of the prevalence of
various trade remedies, stricter subsidy disciplines, and broader fiscal and politi-
cal constraints in considering whether and how they may choose to take certain
measures to assist industries. These developments have led to more intricate and
less direct methods of intervention. We have, in turn, had to adopt more involved
analyses and tests to determine whether in fact these practices provide countervail-
able subsidies and, if so, the nature and amount of benefit provided.
The so-called upstream subsidy phenomenon is a good example, because it
illustrates how a producer of merchandise situated "downstream" in the manufac-
turing chain may benefit from the provision of government aid, even if such aid
has not been directly provided to the producer in question. The benefit can be
clear in the "real world," but it can be legally established only through a compli-
cated inquiry involving the "upstream" input supplier and an analysis of the
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transaction between those two parties and a comparable arm's-length transaction.
Such complex analyses are necessary if we are to deal with the practices and
activities that matter most in today's competitive markets.
For example, suppose that a producer of steel sheet in Country A receives
subsidies from that country's government. A pipe and tube producer in Country
A purchases steel sheet from that producer and exports it to the United States,
where it is covered by a countervailing duty order. The question arises whether
the subsidies which the steel sheet producer received should be included in the
U.S. government's calculation of subsidies benefiting the pipe and tube producer.
The Department of Commerce will say "yes" and include such "upstream"
subsidies, if the agency determines that a competitive benefit has passed to the
pipe and tube producer based on an examination of a comparable benchmark
transaction at arm's length, and that the subsidy has a significant effect on the
cost of manufacturing the pipe and tube.
The increased complexities in both the antidumping and the countervailing
duty laws have required the Department of Commerce's Import Administration
Bureau to assemble a group of professionals not only thoroughly knowledgeable in
antidumping law but also with expertise in areas of international trade, accounting,
economic and financial analysis, and computer programming.
C. TREND No. 3: INCREASING SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF SECTION 301
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act is a paradigm for both the substantial
increase in congressional activity in the trade field and the evolution of U.S.
trade law toward forms that are both more specific and more complex.
Section 301 is the principal statutory authority under which the President,
through the United States Trade Representative (USTR), may impose retaliatory
trade sanctions against countries that either fail to honor their international trade
commitments or maintain unfair policies and practices that adversely affect U.S.
trade interests. Over the years, Congress has consistently attempted to make
section 301 a more effective tool to open foreign markets to U.S. goods, services,
and technology.
1. Early History
Congress included section 301 in the 1974 Trade Act. (A predecessor provision,
section 252 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, provided roughly comparable
authority.) Section 301 authorized the President to take action against, among
other things, "unjustifiable" or "discriminatory" foreign trade practices, or
"unreasonable" foreign trade practices that burdened, restricted, or discrimi-
nated against U.S. foreign commerce. Section 301 identified the Office of the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations-now USTR-as the forum for
receiving and reviewing petitions complaining about unfair trade practices; for
investigating the allegations; and for making recommendations to the President.
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A great deal of discretion was given to the President to define unfair trade practices
and to determine what type of remedy (if any) was appropriate.
In 1979, as part of the implementing legislation for the GATT Tokyo Round
Agreements, Congress amended section 301 to provide the President with addi-
tional specific authority to take action to enforce U.S. rights under trade
agreements and clarified that the executive branch could self-initiate section 301
cases.
In 1984, concerned by the mounting U.S. merchandise trade deficit (and partic-
ularly by the growing U.S.-Japan trade deficit), Congress revisited section 301.
In the Trade and Tariff Act of that year, Congress expanded section 301 to permit
action against any goods and services of the offending country (not merely those
goods associated with the allegedly unfair trade practice) and specifically provided
that section 301 could be used to address barriers to foreign direct investment
and inadequate protection of intellectual property rights.
2. The 1988 Amendments to Section 301
Notwithstanding more aggressive use of section 301 after the 1984 Amend-
ments (including several cases that were self-initiated by the executive branch),
by 1987 the global merchandise trade deficit was headed toward $160 billion,
and the bilateral trade deficit with Japan was approaching $56 billion. Delays
in obtaining market access persuaded Congress that section 301 as then drafted
was not providing an effective enough remedy for U.S. industry.
Therefore, Congress returned once again to section 301 in the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This time Congress made major changes in-
tended to increase the effective pressure on those foreign countries whose doors
remained closed to American goods and services.
Congress removed the final decision on retaliatory action from the President's
desk and placed it with the USTR. Congress attempted to minimize the USTR's
discretion not to act by making retaliation mandatory in some cases. And it
specified in new detail both the circumstances, policies, and practices that could
trigger retaliation-including, for example, export targeting practices and failure
to provide for adequate worker rights-and the actions that were available to the
USTR under section 301 to address such practices. Congress also tightened up
the deadlines for investigations and determinations under section 301.
3. Special 301
Congress also added a provision to section 301 targeted specifically at protec-
tion of U.S. intellectual property rights. So-called Special 301 requires the USTR,
on an annual basis, to identify those foreign countries that do not provide adequate
and effective protection to intellectual property rights, and to further identify as
"priority countries" those countries whose practices and policies are particularly
egregious and costly to U.S. exporters. The price of intransigence is automatic
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investigation under section 301, with shorter time frames and deadlines for both
the investigation and any subsequent determination to retaliate.
4. Super 301
In addition, Congress added a temporary provision, so-called Super 301. Super
301 required, for a two-year period (1989 and 1990), that USTR list "priority
foreign countries" whose unfair trade policies and practices are particularly nu-
merous, egregious, or costly to U.S. exporters, and begin a section 301 investiga-
tion of those practices. Although the statutory authority for Super 301 has now
expired, the President effectively reinstated it by executive order in September
1994. Under the executive order, USTR must submit a report on priority foreign
country practices no later than September 30 of 1994 and 1995. Within twenty-one
days of submitting the reports USTR must initiate section 301 investigations with
respect to all priority foreign country practices identified.
5. Telecommunications 301
Finally, Congress enacted a section 301-like provision targeted specifically
at telecommunications trade. The deregulation of the U.S. telecommunications
market had opened U.S. markets to foreign competition without any reciprocal
moves by our trading partners. This unilateral U.S. move had created, virtually
overnight, a windfall for foreign suppliers and a significant telecommunications
trade deficit. Accordingly, "telecommunications 301," section 1377 of the 1988
Trade Act, requires the USTR to perform an annual review of all outstanding
telecommunications trade agreements to determine the level of compliance. A
USTR determination of noncompliance is treated as an affirmative "unfairness"
determination under section 301, requiring the imposition of sanctions within
thirty days. Congress specifically instructed that sanctions be first targeted at
telecommunications products and services-a unique feature of this provision.
The effectiveness of section 301 as a "crowbar" to open foreign markets is
difficult to assess precisely. However, there is a strong basis for the conclusion that
section 301 has had a positive impact on the efforts of a series of Administrations to
open foreign markets. Continued vocal pressure from the Congress, plus the
statutory authority of the President and, now, the USTR to act, have clearly
persuaded some countries-particularly Japan-to take reasonable steps to accom-
modate U.S. concerns rather than risk the consequence of denial of access to
the U.S. market. Even without the necessity of formal retaliatory actions, section
301 cases have often resulted in agreements that were satisfactory to the U.S.
Government as well as to domestic industry.
D. TREND No. 4: INCREASING PREVALENCE OF FREE TRADE
AREAS AND CUSTOMS UNIONS
Over the last twenty years the world trading system has increasingly moved
toward regional trading blocs. This evolution is part of a recognizable trend: as
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nations move toward market-oriented systems, volumes of trade increase. As
volumes of trade increase, pressure to remove trade barriers increases.
Free trade areas and customs unions are permissible under the GATT. Although
they were not a major factor in 1948, these regional arrangements are now playing
a significant role both in the western hemisphere and elsewhere. The North
American Free Trade Agreement, the U.S. -Israel Free Trade Agreement, the
European Union, and the European Free Trade Area now account for a major
portion of world trade-approaching 33 percent of global trade in 1992.
Other such arrangements are in the offing as regional interests seek to enhance-
or in some cases secure-the advantages of geographic proximity and economic
integration. For example, currently five major trade pacts are at various stages
of development linking most of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Mercosur will unite Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay in a free trade
area by the end of this year. The so-called G-3 Agreement between Mexico,
Colombia, and Venezuela is in the final stages of negotiations and will create
the second largest free trade area in the region. Colombia and Venezuela have
been a customs union since 1992, and along with Bolivia and Ecuador form the
Andean Free Trade Zone, under the Andean Pact, which hopes to establish a
common external tariff later on this year. The five Spanish-speaking countries
of Central America (with the exception of Panama) have revitalized the Central
American Common Market and are seeking, as a group and individually, bilateral
free trade agreements with Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. The Caribbean
Common Market (CARICOM), established in 1973 and comprising the English-
speaking Caribbean countries, is taking further steps to lower its common external
tariff and further liberalize intramarket trade. CARICOM is also seeking free
trade agreements with Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela.
In addition, in 1980 Mexico and most of the South American countries became
members of the Latin American Integration Association, known by its Spanish
acronym ALADI. ALADI has supplied the institutional and legal framework for
many bilateral and multilateral intraregional agreements. Significant among these
are the bilateral free trade agreements concluded by Chile, which does not belong
to any of the area's trade pacts, with Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina,
and Bolivia within the last three years.
Europe has a longer history of free trade areas and customs unions. The customs
union founded by Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands in 1957-the European Economic Community (EEC)-grew to
include an additional six Member States by 1986. In a parallel development,
several non-EEC Member States established the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) in 1960, creating a customs union among Austria, Denmark, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom that was separate and
independent from the EEC. In 1973 the EEC and EFTA Member States concluded
a series of free trade agreements that led to the gradual establishment of a free
trade area between the two customs unions for industrial and certain agricultural
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processed products. The European Economic Area Agreement, which entered
into effect on January 1, 1993, further strengthened the economic ties between
the EEC and the EFTA by providing for the free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital among their respective Member States. During the course
of this period, the EEC evolved into the European Community (EC) and then
into the European Union (EU), with an ever-increasing number of members,
including some countries that transferred from the EFTA.
While the concept of regional arrangements, such as customs unions and free
trade areas, predates the GATT, the current legal framework is found principally
in article XXIV of the GATT, which provides an exception for such arrangements
provided that (1) "duties and other regulations of commerce" are eliminated on
"substantially all" of their internal trade; and (2) in general, duties and other
regulations of commerce on imports from nonparties are not higher or more
restrictive than they were prior to the effective date of the arrangement.
There is a necessary tension between the objectives of a regional-preference
system such as a free trade area and the fundamental concept of most-favored-
nation treatment. By definition, a customs union or free trade area is a system
based on preference for its parties over nonmember contracting parties. And it
is perhaps too early to tell whether these regional arrangements are in the long-
term best interests of the world trading community. While unquestionably they
contain provisions and offer efficiencies not yet universally available, and thus
afford immediate advantages to their parties, they may also prove to be a distrac-
tion from further multilateral progress toward the same ends.
On the other hand, regional arrangements may serve (and in some instances
have already served) as models for various disciplines, liberalizations, and proce-
dures whose adoption ultimately could improve the multilateral trading system.
For example, certain features of the NAFTA, and its predecessor the U. S. -Canada
Free Trade Agreement, were beneficial to the Uruguay Round process, and others
will serve as a model for future GATT discussions.
E. TREND No. 5: GROWTH IN THE ROLE OF
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS
A fifth important trend involves the settlement of disputes. Over the last twenty-
odd years we have seen a substantial movement toward universal coverage of
all transborder commercial activities through increasingly complex procedures
and standards-particularly in the area of dispute resolution. Dispute resolution,
once the subject only of obscure treatises and law review articles, has now come
into its own. My sense has been that international dispute resolution was where
you ended up when the system failed. Now, dispute resolution has become an
effective way for the contracting parties to interpret and refine their rights and
obligations. Rather than an example of the system's failure, it is becoming yet
another example of how the system is supposed to work.
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The use of dispute resolution mechanisms is a welcome development. Our
international trade structure should not stop where agreement ends. It should
anticipate that disputes are part of the process itself, and provide mechanisms
that are responsive and workable.
1. U.S. -Canada Free Trade Agreement
For example, the U.S. -Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) created a bina-
tional dispute-resolution process involving quasi-judicial panels, replete with
rules of procedure, standing rosters of panelists, and a limited appellate process.
Chapter 19 of the CFTA created a unique system for binational review of
final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations made by the U.S. and
Canadian Governments. Article 1904 establishes a mechanism for replacing judi-
cial review of final determinations with review by independent binational panels
composed of five members selected from the affected countries. These panels
expeditiously review final determinations to determine whether they are consistent
with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing country.
Chapter 19 of the CFTA also created a unique appellate process to safeguard
against impropriety or gross panel error that could threaten the integrity of the
binational panel review process. The United States or Canada may appeal a
binational panel's decision to a three-member "extraordinary challenge commit-
tee" composed of U.S. and Canadian judges or former judges.
The CFTA's antidumping and countervailing duty dispute-resolution architec-
ture has created a number of challenges for Canada and the United States. The me-
chanics of selecting panelists, the number of panelists, and the fact that all of them
may not be lawyers, raise new issues for the practitioner and for the administering
authorities. In addition, the mix of Canadian and U.S. panelists has meant, for ex-
ample, that Canadian panelists serving on U.S. panels may be experiencing U.S.
antidumping/countervailing duty law for the first time, and vice versa.
Reaction to panel determinations has been mixed. U.S. industry has, on occa-
sion, been chagrined by CFTA panel determinations. On the other hand, U.S.
industry has also been reasonably satisfied by many panel decisions. By and large,
the U.S. experience with this dispute-settlement mechanism has been favorable.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement
As another example, the NAFTA provides for even more complex procedures
outside the antidumping and countervailing area. Under chapter 20 of the NAFTA
(the successor to chapter 18 of the CFTA), the NAFTA Trade Commission will
attempt to resolve disputes among the parties. If the Commission is not successful,
a panel may be formed under either the GATT or the NAFTA-the choice of which
itself may require further consultations. A host of special rules applies to the deci-
sion of whether and when to proceed under either the GATT or the NAFTA.
Five-member panels are selected from rosters that themselves are subject to
trilateral agreement through reverse selection. Special rosters may be made up
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of financial experts. Elaborate rules of procedure provide for written submissions,
rebuttals and at least one oral hearing. There are strict time limits to ensure
prompt resolution. A special procedure permits the formation of scientific boards
to provide expert advice to panels on factual questions related to the environment
and other scientific matters.
Strict time limits apply and, if a panel determines that the responding country
has acted in a manner inconsistent with its NAFTA obligations, and the disputing
countries do not reach agreement within thirty days or other mutually agreed
period after receipt of the report, the complaining country may suspend the
application of equivalent benefits until the issue is resolved. Any country that
considers the retaliation to be excessive may obtain a panel ruling on this question.
3. GATT Dispute Settlement Understanding
The Dispute-Settlement Understanding negotiated during the GATT Uruguay
Round agreements is far more defined and comprehensive than was previously
the case. When Congress identified the negotiating objectives for the Uruguay
Round in the 1988 Trade Act, the very first principal objective listed was the
establishment of a more effective process for the settlement of GATT disputes:
"to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute mechanisms and proce-
dures" and "to ensure that such mechanisms within the GATT and the GATT
agreements provide for more effective and expeditious resolution of disputes and
enable better enforcement of United States rights."
The reasons are clear. Not only was the previous system prone to frustration
and delay, but too often the United States was forced to live with continuing
violations by our trading partners because the GATT was unable or unwilling
to give effect to its decisions.
Although the system has been working reasonably well in recent years, the Uru-
guay Round Dispute-Settlement Understanding goes further toward resolving these
problems. It establishes a comprehensive, transparent dispute-settlement regime in-
tended to cover disputes arising under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements.
Among other things, the Understanding limits the time frames for resolution of
GATT disputes. It provides a comprehensive mechanism for the resolution of GATT
disputes and requires that GATT parties adhere to its rules. It prevents a party from
frustrating the rulings of GATT dispute panels by refusing to recognize them: under
current GATT rules, unanimous agreement is required to implement a panel decision;
under the new rules, unanimous agreement will be required to reject a panel decision.
Further, the new rules explicitly recognize the right of an aggrieved party to retaliate
if an adequate and appropriate remedy is not secured.
F. TREND No. 6: INCREASING Focus ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION
Intensive focus on intellectual property rights is trend number six. In the matur-
ing U.S. economy, intellectual property and advanced technology are our cutting-
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edge assets. The Clinton Administration is committed to maximizing the value
of these assets by ensuring that international protection of intellectual property
is strengthened, thereby encouraging increased exports by U.S. companies.
1. Billions of Lost Revenues
Intellectual property has clearly become an ever-increasing factor in U.S.
exports in recent years. In August 1991 Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights,
estimated that intellectual property accounted for an estimated 25 percent of U.S.
exports, up from 12 percent just eight years before. My guess is that even 25
percent would be much too low an estimate in 1994.
Equally apparent is that despite some progress in recent years, the United States
is continuing to lose billions of dollars a year in exports because of inadequate
intellectual property rights protection in foreign countries. For example, earlier
this year the International Intellectual Property Alliance estimated that "copyright
industries lose an estimated $15-17 billion annually due to piracy outside the
United States." Similarly, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association has
estimated that in 1993 its member companies lost more than $500 million in
Brazil and $60 million in Turkey, and that pharmaceutical research companies
in general lost $150 million in India, among other examples.
2. Commitment to Strengthen Intellectual Property Rights
The Clinton Administration is firmly committed to strengthening the interna-
tional protection of U.S. intellectual property rights. The NAFTA, and the re-
cently concluded Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS
Agreement) are two critically important elements of the Administration's strategy
for better protecting U.S. intellectual property rights. The NAFTA and the TRIPS
Agreement are, in turn, complemented by a variety of bilateral tools such as
Special 301 consultations, bilateral intellectual property rights agreements, tech-
nical assistance to foreign intellectual property rights agencies, and bilateral in-
vestment treaties.
But the benefits of our policies are not limited to American inventors, workers,
and companies. A higher level of intellectual property rights protection throughout
the world benefits everyone-host countries seeking foreign investment, countries
seeking to export high technology goods and services, consumers that benefit
from improved goods and services, and workers that find higher paying jobs
in new industries based upon intellectual property rights protected discoveries.
Adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights is not a zero-sum
game, but rather the classic win-win situation for both industrialized and devel-
oping countries.
In recent years, many countries have improved their laws and regulations on
intellectual property protection. We expect that the intellectual property laws on
the books in most developing countries-including the "Big Emerging Mar-
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kets"-will steadily improve as a result of our bilateral efforts and the implementa-
tion of the Uruguay Round TRIPS Agreement.
Much has been said in the United States about the perceived shortcomings of
the TRIPS Agreement. We would have preferred a TRIPS Agreement without
such features as a ten-year transition period for the adoption of pharmaceutical
product patent protection by developing countries. However, even with its short-
comings, the TRIPS Agreement represents a very important milestone in the
international protection of intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement
generally raises the baseline of intellectual property rights protection throughout
the world and-equally importantly-permits the United States to use World
Trade Organization dispute resolution procedures to enforce its provisions.
Whereas in the past there was no international consensus on the use of trade
sanctions against countries that failed to provide adequate protection for U.S.
intellectual property rights, the new World Trade Organization dispute-resolution
provisions will enable the United States to use trade sanctions against any member
that fails to comply with the TRIPS Agreement.
3. Need for Greater Enforcement
The focus of our international intellectual property rights activities has begun
to shift in the last couple of years from seeking the adoption of sound foreign
intellectual property rights laws to ensuring the enforcement of such laws. This
shift in focus is both a sign of progress and an important new challenge in the
U.S. government's effort to secure adequate and effective intellectual property
rights protection internationally.
Ensuring that laws are adequately enforced is an even more difficult task than
drafting and enacting good intellectual property rights agreements and laws.
Enforcement is a matter of workable procedures; willingness of courts and govern-
ment agencies to apply improved laws; the technical expertise of courts, judges,
police, and IPR agencies; public respect for intellectual property rights in a
country.
4. The Case of China
The People's Republic of China is a classic case in point. The United States
and other industrialized countries have, in recent years, encouraged China to
adopt a relatively good set of laws and regulations on intellectual property rights
protection. Indeed, China is to be commended for having, in a relatively short
amount of time, adopted relatively modern intellectual property rights laws and
joined such important international conventions as the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property.
Yet, in practice, China's level of intellectual property rights enforcement has
ranged from poor to virtually nonexistent. The good intellectual property rights
laws China has adopted have not yet resulted in truly adequate and effective
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protection for intellectual property rights. In part, this ineffective protection is
due to a lack of adequate criminal penalties and enforcement, especially in the
copyright area. As a result, improvement of intellectual property rights enforce-
ment in China has been, and continues to be, a very important priority for this
Administration.
This Administration is not singling China out for special attention on the issue
of intellectual property rights enforcement. Effective intellectual property rights
enforcement also has been an issue the United States has raised in various industri-
alized (for example, Italy) and developing countries. It is a subject that will
receive even greater attention in the years ahead as we increasingly shift our focus
to evaluating the effectiveness of foreign intellectual property rights enforcement.
G. EXCEPTION TO THE TREND: CHANGES IN EXPORT CONTROLS
Export controls is one area-perhaps the only area-in which the forces of
change in international trade law have results that may only be described as
deregulatory.
Since 1949 a mainstay of U.S. national security policy has been the careful
review of proposed exports of U.S. goods and technology to certain countries
where their contribution to those countries' military potential could prove detri-
mental to the security of the United States and its allies. The Export Administration
Act of 1969 and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) laid down funda-
mental precepts that remain valid to this day.
Continuous amendment, interpretation, and implementation of the EAA by
successive congresses, administrations, and the international trade bar has become
a fact of life so necessary and so obvious that it is difficult to imagine Washington
without it.
1. Wide Reach of Export Controls
The EAA controls the export or reexport to various foreign countries of U.S.-
origin goods and technology that are classified as "dual-use." Dual-use goods
are those primarily commercial items that could have a military application.
Licensing of certain exports of nuclear materials and technology is the responsibil-
ity of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, while the Department of State is
responsible for licensing exports of defense articles and services. Under current
law, controls may be maintained for national security or foreign policy reasons,
or in the event of limited domestic supply. The Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Export Administration implements export control responsibilities under
the authority of the EAA and through the Export Administration Regulations.
The EAA has seen many modifications and refinements since 1949 (most
recently in 1988); however, the basic structure of the Act, as well as its
fundamental premises, has remained relatively unchanged. The EAA autho-
rizes controls on not only exports of U.S.-origin goods and technology, but
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subsequent reexports. Similarly, the Export Administration Regulations apply
to any person who exports such goods and technology from the United States.
They also apply to a person who reexports these items from any foreign coun-
try, and also to certain products of U.S. goods and technology. The reach of
the Act and its implementing regulations is therefore very broad, extending
to persons-including foreign companies-that may have no other legal or
corporate affiliation with the United States.
2. Sea Change in Approach
It is now apparent that we are on the edge of a sea change in our approach
to export controls and their appropriate role. Once again, the EAA is about to
expire. The Administration submitted to Congress in February a comprehensive
revision of the EAA that reflects both changes in the post-Cold War world and
the new focus on the growing threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. It also firmly commits the Administration to making the cumbersome
export licensing process more efficient and effective. We are working closely
with the Congress to ensure the passage of legislation that is both responsive to
the needs of U.S. exporters and tough on proliferation.
Even as we speak, however, the export control regime that has existed since
the end of World War H-the primary regime that most of us have known-is
undergoing massive and wrenching changes. The Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) is no more. Certain multilateral export
controls will be administered by a successor regime that will focus on the sale
of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use items to countries of concern, such
as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Members of this regime are likely to include
formerly COCOM-proscribed nations, such as Russia, that agree to adhere to
nonproliferation norms and control regimes and to exercise restraint in conven-
tional arms transfers.
In recognition of the changed international security situation, the Clinton Ad-
ministration has implemented a sweeping liberalization of Cold War export con-
trols, particularly on high-value products such as computers and telecommunica-
tions equipment. For example, computers have been generally decontrolled to
almost all destinations up to 260 MTOPS (millions of theoretical operations per
second). A general license to free world destinations and civilian end-users in
formerly proscribed COCOM countries, such as Russia and China, is now avail-
able up to 1000 MTOPS. Computers used to be controlled at 12.5 MTOPS-
roughly an old Apple MacIntosh computer. The new levels decontrol most office
desktop computers-which are readily available from foreign suppliers.
We have agreed with the Japanese to raise the supercomputer threshold to
1500 MTOPS-only recently, it was a mere 195 MTOPS-and are continuing
discussions regarding further revision to 2000 MTOPS. We have also recently
removed most validated licensing requirements for telecommunications equip-
ment shipments to all but a few sensitive destinations, such as those countries
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supporting acts of international terrorism. In addition, following the determination
in COCOM to liberalize controls on many items, we have implemented a new
authorization, known as General License GLX, to permit exports of a wide range
of items to civil end users in formerly COCOM-proscribed countries.
3. New Opportunities for Business
Notwithstanding the problems and uncertainties that undoubtedly lie ahead,
these developments present major new opportunities for U.S. businesses. In
furtherance of the many recommendations intended to bring our export controls
further into line with the economic security needs of the 1990s, as reflected in
the Report of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, chaired by Secretary
Brown, the Department of Commerce is also undertaking a major new initiative
to review, restructure, and clarify the Export Administration Regulations. Anyone
practicing in this area will recognize the need for this initiative, for the regulations
have not seen a comprehensive review in decades.
Restructuring the multilateral system of export controls, as well as establishing
new ground rules for unilateral controls, will not be an easy task. The current
and prospective working environment differs in many respects from that which
existed only a few short years ago. First, we are entering an era that will define
its goals principally in terms of nonproliferation: nuclear, chemical/biological,
missile technology, and other weapons of mass destruction. In this post-Cold
War era the Western allies no longer have a monopoly on either hardware or
technology. Still, working together, we can take great strides to effectively stem
the proliferation of these materials and technologies. Second, many of the coun-
tries in which these nonproliferation concerns have arisen or will arise are also
our trading partners.
Does this mean the end of dual-use controls? Assuredly not. However, we
are now operating in an environment that better focuses controls on critical goods
and technology and allows U.S. businesses greater opportunities to export dual-
use goods to legitimate civilian end users. Do a number of rules of play remain
to be fleshed out? Absolutely. For example, the entire field of export controls
will be operating in a new environment, as the debate shifts from the Cold War
paradigm to a greater focus on multilateral controls and nonproliferation.
III. Looking Ahead
As I look ahead, I see several imperatives for U.S. trade law, and also several
major challenges. Let me describe them briefly.
A. GATT IMPLEMENTATION
On April 15th Ambassador Kantor signed, on behalf of the President, the
protocols embodying U.S. accession to the agreements negotiated during the
Uruguay Round. This action marks an important milestone in the GATT process.
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The President will now submit, and the Congress must pass, implementing legisla-
tion that fully and faithfully implements our new commitments, assures that the
commitments of our trading partners will be honored, and maintains the strength
of our trade laws.
The job of drafting legislation that remains true to these goals is not proving
to be easy. Our success, however, will be measured by at least two criteria.
First, antidumping and countervailing duty laws must remain strong. They are
essential to the overall framework of U.S. trade law. The United States must
retain freedom reasonably to interpret and carry out U.S. law, provided we do
so in a manner that is GATT-consistent.
The GATT Dispute Settlement Understanding, discussed earlier, presents par-
ticularly thorny legal and policy problems. Under the new system, no single
GATT member will have the ability to block unilaterally the adoption of an
adverse panel decision.
Thus, the day may come when our government will have to implement a GATT
decision with which it disagrees, or face retaliation from other governments. But
we will not permit the GAT to provide a remedy to private parties and become
a substitute for domestic courts. The implementing legislation will therefore provide
that, if we accept the panel decision, we will implement it in a prospective manner,
as has been our consistent practice, through changes to U.S. law if necessary.
Second, we must maintain the strength of section 301. Section 301 constitutes
one of our critical tools for achieving market access. The new GATT dispute
settlement procedures achieved U.S. objectives of a predictable and timely GATT
dispute settlement process, which could not be blocked indefinitely and which
contains time frames consistent with the deadlines of section 301. The new proce-
dures will significantly enhance the ability of the United States to enforce its
GATT rights without affecting the ability of the United States to use section 301
to open markets whether or not GATT rules apply. Super 301, as extended last
month by the President, will continue to enhance our ability to pry open the most
egregious closed markets.
Consistent with existing law, and in conformity with the Uruguay Round text's
multilateralism commitment, the United States will have recourse to, and will be
required to abide by, GAT'T dispute settlement procedures for practices covered by
GAiT disciplines, including GATT approval of retaliation. As a result, because of
the expanded GAIT disciplines, more section 301 cases will have to go through
GATT dispute settlement procedures. This development is consistent with the current
section 301, which requires the United States to initiate GAT dispute settlement
procedures when it undertakes a section 301 investigation involving GATT issues.
This commitment will not prevent the United States from using section 301 for
foreign unfair practices not covered by GATT rules, however.
Once the GATT Agreements come into effect, we will need to monitor carefully
the performance of our trading partners. The Clinton Administration is committed
to an activist approach to tracking performance of our trading partners under the
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GATT Agreements. The Department of Commerce will be particularly vigilant
in the area of dumping and subsidies. For example, the Subsidies Agreement
provides that nonactionable "Green Light" subsidies must nonetheless conform
to all of the criteria set forth for the relevant category and establishes procedures
for ensuring that subsidizing governments do not cheat. It is essential that the
United States take maximum advantage of these procedural safeguards to ensure
that our trading partners play by the rules.
B. THE JAPAN PROBLEM
As we all know, one of the major trade issues that has bedeviled successive
American administrations since the late 1960s has been how to encourage Japan
to open its market wider and faster. The Clinton Administration, no less than
the others, has been searching intensely for a formula-so far, without dramatic
breakthroughs.
The inability to open Japan's market has not stemmed from a lack of analysis,
studies, commissions, or negotiations. To date, the major successes have come
only with targeted pressure from Washington, usually backed by the threat of
sanctions, as in the recent case of cellular telephones.
Such pressure is likely to continue, and my guess is that it will work for a
while longer. But because sanctions are targeted on one sector or one product, the
larger issue-Japan's industrial organization itself, which includes interlocking
relationships among firms that would never be permitted to exist in the United
States-has really been outside the ambit of American trade law, or any trade
law. Past administrations have tried to get through this gigantic trade barrier via
talks about structural impediments to trade, but made little headway. Our own
Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department have from time to time consid-
ered the application of antitrust law to Japan, but thus far we have not pursued
this complicated option.
C. ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION
Another major issue which we face is integrating those nonmarket economies
that are former communist nations into the global trading arena. Such integrations
present numerous issues, including a host of necessary domestic reforms in those
countries and assistance from the IMF and other international organizations. A major
part of the question, however, concerns how our dumping laws-and the antidumping
laws of other OECD countries-deal with these "economies in transition."
"Economies in transition" are countries moving from one economic system
to another. Many of these economies, such as Russia, Hungary, and the Czech
and Slovak Republics, are emerging from fifty years of central planning under
communist systems, and the United States supports their efforts to become market-
oriented. This transformation cannot happen overnight, and these countries have
yet to fully achieve their goal.
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At present, most of the economies in transition are still considered nonmarket
economies under the U.S. antidumping law. The United States strongly believes
that increased international trade is their best opportunity for development. Be-
cause we are the most open large economy in the world, many nations are tempted
to think that we will be the dumping ground of last resort-much as we have
been in the past. The Clinton Administration will not allow this primary source
of foreign aid. We cannot absorb all of the world's excess production. We want
to encourage trade with these countries, but we cannot allow domestic industries
to be injured by unfair pricing.
To this end, we will continue to work with the economies in transition so
that they understand how the antidumping law works and how to avoid having
unnecessary problems under it. Moreover, as the economies of these countries
develop, the Department of Commerce will change their designation from a
nonmarket to a market economy as it did for Poland in 1993.
However, the statute gives the Department limited discretion in the administra-
tion of the law. If a case is filed providing sufficient evidence that injurious
dumping is occurring, the Department must initiate the investigation. Further-
more, the law specifies the methodology to be used in nonmarket economy cases.
The existence of antidumping investigations should not be interpreted as a policy
decision to discourage trade with economies in transition, but a realization of
our responsibility under the law not to become the dumping ground for the world's
excess production.
Russia and the other economies in transition are going to need help in making
the transition to market economy status, and they are going to have to make
major adjustments themselves. In dealing with these complicated issues we will
need to keep certain factors in mind:
" First, the integration of economies in transition into the world economy is
a challenge on the order of importance and difficulty as the challenge of
reintegrating Japan, Germany, and many former colonies into the global
economy after World War II. It will not happen overnight, and it will require
a herculean effort.
" Second, the burden of adjustment must be spread. The effort must be multilat-
eral and include both the economies in transition and the market economies.
* Finally, we need policies that really are appropriate to transition. This re-
quirement means having policies with enough flexibility to reward economies
in transition that are taking tough adjustment measures, and the procedures
to differentiate those nations from others not making those efforts.
Thus far the global framework for helping them is barely developed. We will
need to think through the balance between macro adjustments and industry-by-
industry adjustments. We will need to look again at barriers to market access
that these countries face, barriers that could keep them out of world markets.
We will have to think about sensible ways to work with our own industries as
they feel the brunt of new production from economies in transition, and we
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must work closely with the European Union, Japan, and other industrial market
economies so that none of us is forced to accept disproportionately the twin
burdens of increased imports and escalating foreign aid.
D. DEVELOPING TRENDS
More generally, I see a number of trends and imperatives developing in the
law of international trade. Most of these are related in some way to the fact that the
world is growing smaller in economic, political, legal, social and environmental
terms.
1. Convergence and Clash of Laws and Values
One consequence of a smaller world is the convergence of rules of law-
and the cultural values represented in rules of law-into the same small space.
Convergence is a good watchword for a process we are going to see in a variety
of contexts in coming years.
In both the NAFTA and the GATT Round we have seen for the first time
attempts to build in the recognition of policy goals that go beyond traditional
trade goals. The NAFTA side agreements were intended specifically to ensure
that the NAFTA does not have unforeseen environmental effects or affect ad-
versely the rights of North American workers. In Geneva we have supported an
initiative to create a standing Committee on Trade and the Environment. Earlier
this month, we were able formally to place worker rights on the GATT's table.
GSP renewal, later this year, already depends on adequate recognition of worker
rights and will likely see a variety of environmental criteria built in to the process.
I am a strong believer that we should promote our values abroad. I also force-
fully support the need to press for standards of environmental protection and
workers' rights-not just because it's the right thing to do, but because we have
hard economic interests at stake. The big issue is how to link the pursuit of these
values and goals to trade policy. I say "how," and not "whether," because
realistically I believe the NAFTA set the precedent for us. Nevertheless, the
exact nature of the linkage for the future needs to be carefully thought out by
both policy makers and lawyers.
There is a parallel with respect to human rights considerations as well. Under
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, for example, China's most-favored-nation status
is linked to annual presidential determinations of significant overall progress in
human rights, with a determination to be made by June 3, 1994. The deficiencies
of this situation are, it seems to me, quite clear. As one of the world's largest and
fastest-growing economies, China is an important member of the international eco-
nomic community. We all want China's most-favored-nation status to be renewed;
equally clearly, we need to see significant progress on human rights. Between now
and June 3, 1994, the policy is clear and set by the President's Executive Order,
which stipulates the need for significant overall progress in human rights as a condi-
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tion for most-favored nation renewal. However, after June, attempting to accom-
plish both goals in the context of an annual confrontation over most-favored nation
status and human rights is not a truly workable way to proceed year after year. We
need to find a better way to pursue both our commercial and our human rights goals
in a way that leads to results in both cases.
With the growing volume of world trade, and with the importance of such
commerce to all countries, we will see an escalation of tensions as countries'
differing policy priorities and legal systems clash. The effort to link trade policy
to other areas not historically considered part of trade-such as environmental
protection or workers' rights-will make these problems more intense. Whatever
one wants to say about the policy priorities or the proposed linkages themselves,
one thing is clear: we will need more of an underlying consensus among the
trading nations of the world before there can be a well-developed and effective
framework to deal with the issues.
2. Limits of Anglo/Western Legal Framework
This leads me to a broader point. In thinking about the way the world trading
system has evolved these past several decades, one may reasonably conclude
that it has been an era in which American ideas and American legal principles
have been profoundly influential around the globe. I have heard it said, for
example, that the GATT system was originally based on an implicit premise:
countries could have access to the U.S. market. They had to play by American
rules. As evidence of this thesis, we need look no farther than the GATT itself
(many of whose original features were U.S. -inspired), the various GATT codes,
and the new GATT agreements recently concluded, all of which contain U.S.-
inspired provisions and principles.
However, even this predominant American influence-over half a century-
which followed naturally from U.S. economic and political leadership during
the Cold War, could not fundamentally alter the legal and cultural thinking of
societies whose origins predated ours-in some cases by thousands of years.
Western legal and cultural traditions may not be well-equipped to bridge the
differences that now seem to be emerging with greater force.
I have in mind especially Asia. Here is a geopolitical region that is of immense
importance to U.S. interests. Some of the Asian economies are among the wealthi-
est and fastest-growing on earth. Yet, Asian cultures and values and legal systems
are significantly different than ours. Compared to many Asian countries, we have,
for example, different commercial systems, based on different legal concepts in
many areas that are the cornerstone of business activity, such as intellectual
property rights, taxation, securities and corporate law, competition law, bank-
ruptcy law, and dispute settlement. Some of these fields of law are not found at
all in certain Asian economies and legal systems.
I do not know how this clash of styles will play out, but we can see that the
force of our law has not been overly successful in Japan and China, and my
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guess is that this will increasingly be the case as time goes on and as the "Pacific
Century" enters into full force. We may have to find ways to be more flexible
in our approach to issues that others perceive from different angles. At a minimum,
we must blend styles and legal concepts, something that we have not had to do
in the post-war era.
The Department of Commerce has conducted a number of legal exchanges
and seminars in recent years, as a way of helping to resolve these issues. For
example, we have held six joint legal seminars with China between 1983 and
1988, in which we discussed our legal regimes governing trade and investment.
These seminars offered an excellent opportunity for each country to learn more
about the other's legal system.
Exchanges of this nature are evolving into more elaborate structures, such as
the Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) that the Department has
established in Eastern Europe. The CLDP, funded in part by the Agency for
International Development to support the economic and political reforms under-
way in Eastern Europe, focuses on laws and regulations affecting both domestic
and international trade and investment. It emphasizes supporting the host govern-
ment's identification of policy objectives and building the skills and structures
necessary to implement those objectives.
The CLDP has placed expert advisors in the region for periods ranging from one
week to one year and has conducted workshops, seminars, and individual consulta-
tions in both the United States and the host countries. The programs have covered
international project financing, the negotiation and documentation of international
joint ventures, government ethics, public procurement, and export controls.
The CLDP has also sponsored internships in the United States for law students
and attorneys. U.S. law firms, the legal departments of U.S. corporations, ac-
counting firms, and trade associations have hosted interns. These activities have
been instrumental in facilitating progress in the legal regimes of the host countries.
IV. The Limits of Legalism: The Need for Better Economic Diplomacy
This brings me to the limits of "legalism." The trend in our trade law, as I
have tried to show, is towards more specific laws with less discretion in their
administration. The statutes require ever-stricter timetables and increasingly pre-
cise measures.
There is no question that we must be firm in pursuing our interests. Nor do
I deny for a minute that we have the world's most open market and hence that
we are fully justified in pressing others to open theirs. The issue, however, is
not what makes us feel vindicated or good, but what will work in a world market-
place that is so interconnected, one in which so many new and powerful players
are emerging, and one in which our interests as both the world's largest importer
and exporter-and as home to many of the world's most truly international compa-
nies-complicate the definition of our national interests.
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To this end, I believe that we need to take a harder look at how we conduct
our global diplomacy in the trade arena. We have developed an effective style
when it comes to imposing pressure and sanctions-first attempt to negotiate,
then, if negotiations fail, threaten sanctions and, if necessary, escalate to the
highest political levels. But all this assumes that the unilateral exercise of Ameri-
can law is the only way to go.
As I have stated, in many cases we have no choice, and we should be as
aggressive as necessary. But other occasions will call for more quiet and private
negotiations so that the problem never reaches the level of public confrontation.
These situations will entail anticipating problems long before they reach the crisis
point; a quiet but full court press by American officials, led by the ambassador
on the spot; and serious consultations at an early stage with the local business
community-not just American executives, but those who are citizens of the
country in question and who often can exert pressure on their governments if
they can do so out of the public spotlight. It will require a rethinking of multilateral
diplomacy and an elevation of its importance in order to get more countries on
our side at an early date, perhaps with the use of more horsetrading on issues
they deem extremely important.
I am not saying that we do not put a tremendous amount of time or effort into
economic diplomacy now. But the truth is that most of our preoccupation is
with negotiating tactics. What is now called for is an additional emphasis on
medium-term strategies that lay the foundation for more multilateral support for
our efforts and goals and that emphasize the tools of quiet persuasion rather than
eleventh-hour crisis management-although there will always be some of that.
Such an emphasis will in turn require that more effort go into the sophisticated
analysis of how trade policy is made abroad, which individuals and groups in
foreign countries can be our allies, and how we can best deal with them in an
early stage. Such an effort will no doubt require a reorganization of our key
embassies to build up the staffs with professionals knowledgeable about trade
and politics-not just one or the other. It will also require a changed mindset at
home, including a broad dialogue between the Administration and Congress de-
voted to the new challenges we face in a changing world economy.
V. Conclusion
I am sure that as a layman I have missed several important issues, not to
mention many nuances. Nevertheless, as change engulfs our country and the
world, I do believe that we need a better interchange between lawyers and others
involved in the making of trade policy. Amidst the mind-boggling changes in
the international economy, I doubt that any of us really sees the entire picture
or that, if we do, it is sufficiently balanced. For all these reasons I appreciate
this chance to throw out these ideas to the legal community, and I look forward
to our discussion-which I hope can begin today and continue well into the future.
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